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Abstract. With the help of several case studies from the 16th, 17th and 18th centu-
ries, this article focuses on two key questions. How did ordinary Dutch citizens protect 
themselves against corruption and misuse of power by law enforcement agents, public 
prosecutors and the courts? And, whose interests were actually being served by the 
early modern criminal justice system? Or, put another way: whose order was being 
maintained and who was excluded from it? 
Its is argued that the weakness of a critical traditional in Dutch —and possibly even 
more widely, in Continental European— historiography concerning these issues fits in 
with the Continental perspective in which the rights of the state are emphasized rather 
than the rights of the individual. In England (perhaps even in the wider Anglosaxon 
context) the opposite seems to be the case: a critical historiographical tradition juxtapo-
sed to a past in which civil rights rather than state privilieges were emphasized, together 
with resistance to the state and other bastions of power. 
Key words: Corruption, civil rights, judicial history & historiography, microhistory. 
"Sucia justicia": Corrupción, desigualdad y derechos civiles en la 
Holanda de la Edad Moderna. 
Resumen: Con la ayuda de varios casos prácticos de los siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII, 
este articulo se centra en dos cuestiones clave: ¿cómo se protegían los ciudadanos ho-
1 Archival research for the case studies was done while working for the 
Pioneer project "Judicial history" at the University of Leiden, financed by the 
Dutch Research Organization NWO. This project focused on the massive 
(and still only partially explored) archives of the Supreme Court of the Dutch 
Republic (Hoge Raad) from 1582-1800, and continued from a previous 
project coordinated by Prof. J.Th. de Smidt concerning the archives of the 
Hoge Raad's predecessor for the Southern and Northern Netherlands, the 
Grand Conseil de Malines or Grote Raad van Mechelen. I have integrated 
findings from previous research concerning criminal justice in the Dutch 
Republic which was likewise financed by NWO. I would like to thank the 
universities of Leiden and Utrecht for giving me the opportunity to try out 
some ideas during lectures. With special thanks to Peter Mason, Sjoerd Fa-
ber, Henk van Nierop and Jos de Jong for comments on earlier versions of 
this article and to J.J. Woltjer and N. Plomp for sending me further informa-
tion and references. 
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landeses corrientes de la corrupción y abuso de poder de los agentes encargados de ha-
cer cumplir la ley, de los fiscales públicos y de los tribunales? Y ¿a qué intereses servía 
en realidad el sistema judicial durante la Edad Moderna? O, dicho de otro modo, ¿qué 
orden estaba siendo mantenido y quién era excluido de él? 
En este trabajo se sostiene que la debilidad de una crítica tradicional en Holanda — 
y posiblemente incluso, de manera más amplia, en el continente europeo— se debe a 
que la historiografía sobre estos temas se ajusta a una perspectiva continental, en la que 
se da más importancia a los derechos del Estado que a los derechos del individuo. En 
Inglaterra (o incluso, en el mas amplio contexto anglosajón) lo opuesto parace ser lo ha-
bitual: una tradición historiográfica crítica yuxtapuesta a un pasado en el que se daba 
mayor énfasis a los derechos civiles que a los privilegios del Estado, junto a una resis-
tencia al Estado y a otros bastiones del poder. 
Palabras clave: Corrupción, derechos civiles, historia judicial e historiografía, mi-
crohistoria. 
"Justice?— 
You get justice in the next world, 
in this world you have the law". 
William Gaddis, 
A Frolic of his Own (1994). 
1. Introduction 
Much is known about the formal structures of political power, the 
administrative and judicial organisation, and political participation in 
the early modern Netherlands. Yet we are hardly familiar with what 
legal inequality really meant, how prosecution strategy in the 16th, 
17th and 18th centuries could be used as a political instrument, or 
what happened when a private citizen became the victim of corrupt 
officials. Could anybody help? To whom could a victim turn for pro-
tection? Did criminal justice and procedure offer any guarantees? And 
if so, how, and were such means available to all members of society? 
Or did it make more sense to forget about justice and resort to other 
strategies: lay low, resort to violence, flee the country, bribe some 
other officials, look for help among the political enemies of the perse-
cutors, start a riot, hire a gang, or find an influential person who could 
act as intermediary? It is also possible that the officials of these ages 
were so powerful that they erased all traces of their misdemeanours, 
and thus whitewashed their historical image for ever. 
These matters were important to many early modern Europeans — 
they could even be critically important— and the Netherlands was no 
exception in this respect. Just as in any other part of the world, some 
[MyC, 4,2001,43-91] 
Crooked justice. Corruption, inequality and civic rights... 45 
private persons found themselves persecuted by corrupt officials and 
became the victims of their abuse of power 2. The means used by these 
victims to defend themselves against abuse inform us not only about 
relations between public authorities and private citizens in these areas 
but also about the structures of power. Research into these issues 
shows us a side of early modern society that is not revealed in the 
idealised representations of relations between subjects and authorities 
that are based on analyses of legislation, bureaucratic structures, or 
administrative and judicial organisation. 
In Great Britain much attention has been paid to such themes 
during the last three or four decades —especially by scholars con-
nected with the "E. P. Thompson-tradition"3. The same cannot be said 
of the Netherlands, in spite of a considerable and respectable Dutch 
historiographical tradition in the field of criminal justice and crimi-
nality. The cause of this absence —which can certainly not be ex-
plained by a general lack of interest in English historiography— must 
be sought in the general orientation of Dutch historiography in this 
field. It lacks a connection with any kind of explicit social critique4. In 
2 Little can be said about numbers or percentages given the nature of this 
problem and the concomitant scarcity of documentation. 
3 Besides Edward P. Thompson's own writings, two of the most inspiring 
publications have been for me: Keith WRIGHTSON, "Two concepts of order: 
justices, constables and jurymen in seventeenth-century England" in John 
BREWER and John STYLES (eds.), An ungovernable people. The English and 
their law in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, London, Hutchinson, 
1980, pp. 21-46; and V.A.C. GATRELL, The Hanging Tree. Execution and 
the English People 1770-1868, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994. Of 
course, I would not want to argue in this essay that a critical tradition is 
absent in other Continental European countries as well. Italy immediately 
comes to mind with the journal Quaderni Storici and scholars such as Carlo 
Ginzburg, Ottavia Niccoli, Guido Ruggiero, Andrea Zorzi, to name but a 
few. 
4 Naturally, this is a generalization -which may not be out of place since 
we are discussing dominant trends here. It is striking that scholars from the 
Southern Netherlands (such as Blockmans and Van Rompaey for the Bur-
gundian period) did explicitly pay attention to corruption, abuse of power, 
the role of bailiffs and sheriffs etc. Blockmans' central argument, however, 
concerns the development of an administrative ethic and the establishment of 
a public judicial system —that is, topics in which the state is the focus after 
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so far as any paradigms have been influential, it has been at the 
'Continental' view of Michel Foucault or Norbert Elias, who focus on 
the state, rather than 'British' perspectives in which class struggle, 
social inequality, and different concepts of justice are given far more 
attention5. In Dutch historiography the usual perspective is 'top 
down', concentrating on the state and public authority in its diverse 
manifestations —even if the state in question was one of the most po-
litically fragmented ones to be found in Europe. Themes like power 
and discipline are well represented in Dutch historiography, but they 
are largely discussed in terms of topics such as the increasing or de-
creasing severity of punishment (especially during the ancien regime), 
the history of imprisonment (17th-20th centuries) and the organisation 
of the police in the 19 t h and 20th centuries6. 
This orientation is not coincidental, but reflects —either explicitly 
or implicitly— two closely connected dominant and conservative 
perspectives on law and justice in history. The first concentrates on 
civil law and presents judicial practice in an anachronistic way as an 
instrument for conflict settlement. However, few cases dealt with by 
the civil courts in early modern Europe were resolved in court. Many 
all. See especially Wim BLOCKMANS, "Privaat en openbaar domein. Ho-
llandse ambtenaren voor de rechter onder de Bourgondiêrs" en Jean-Marie 
DUVOSQUEL & Erik THOEN (eds.), Peasants and townsmen in Medieval 
Europe. Studia in honorem Adriaan Ver huis t, Ghent, Snoeck-Ducaju, 1995, 
pp. 707-719, and Jan VAN ROMPAEY, Het grafelijk baljuwsambt in 
Vlaanderen tijdens de Boergondische période, Brussels, Paleis der 
Academiën, 1967. 
5 The work of Sjoerd Faber, Pieter Spierenburg, Arend Huussen, and 
Herman Diederiks (who died far too young) immediately comes to mind. The 
Dutch branch of the Society for the History of Crime and Criminal Justice 
united for almost 25 years nearly all researchers in the Netherlands interested 
in these themes until 1998. 
6 See for example the work of Pieter Spierenburg on forms of punishment 
and houses of correction, Arend Huussen on criminal justice by the provin-
cial courts of Holland and of Friesland, Herman Franke on penal institutions, 
and Cyrille Fijnaut on the history of the police and trends in prosecution. 
Some exceptions should be mentioned as well: see Herman Roodenburg's 
publications on extra-judicial forms of conflict settlement, Rudolf Dekker's 
work on protest, riot and rebellion, and Lotte van de Pol on prostitution in 
early modem Amsterdam. 
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of them, in fact, escalated, while the original problem multiplied and 
proliferated, causing new cases to be piled on top of the original one 
—a situation only appreciated by the lawyers involved. The second 
perspective presents criminal law and justice as a means to restore 
order, without ever asking whose order this was, what kind of order it 
was, and to what extent we should speak of restoring. 
In this perspective, 20th-century consensus models are projected 
back onto early modern history, creating (or helping to maintain) a 
largely fictive image of a homogeneous and relatively egalitarian 
Dutch society with consensus throughout society about issues such as 
public order and its guardians. This perspective, moreover, ignores the 
fact that criminal justice before 1800 was 'exemplary' in nature all 
over the Continent. Judicial authorities generally concentrated on 
exemplary cases that could be dealt with in a deterrent and symbolic 
way 7. Criminal justice was selective; the goal was to punish and deter, 
but the first objective was perhaps simply to show that there were 
indeed public authorities and that they had some power. 
The great strength of the second perspective (and at the same time 
its main weakness) lies in the fact that it so closely fits the idealised 
self-image of the early modern Dutch authorities. In each and every 
verdict Dutch judges used to call the Dutch Republic "a country of 
good police and justice", meaning a country where public order was 
maintained and laws and established power relations were respected. 
The least we should ask ourselves as historians is what kind of power 
relations and public order they were talking about, which class 
differences were important in this society, and to what extent law and 
justice did function as instruments of power in the hands of certain 
social groups and individuals. Those questions take us into the domain 
of conflict rather than consensus, and into a territory where bodies of 
public authorities acted as rivals, competed for power, and created 
conflicts instead of resolving them. They take us to situations in which 
the powers that be used law and justice for their own private purposes, 
while public authorities intruded into the lives of their subjects in 
brutal, tyrannical, overbearing, and arbitrary ways. 
7 See esp. Esther COHEN, The crossroads of justice. Law and culture in 
late medieval France, Leiden/New York, E.J. Brill, 1993. 
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This article discusses such by no means rare occurrences, focusing 
on a number of Dutch cases and going on to sketch the mechanisms of 
exclusion built into Dutch criminal law and justice. This will show us 
a dark side of Dutch society that must have been familiar to anyone 
alive during these ages, but largely forgotten —or rather blotted out— 
since then by a conceited historiographic self-image in which the tone 
is set retrospectively by politically correct notions of consensus, 
egalitarianism and tolerance. It would be simplistic to generalize the 
Dutch case into a Continental European one, but there are enough 
parallels between the Dutch situation and that in the neighbouring 
countries on the Continent to at least set us thinking about larger 
patterns. 
2. The harassment of a locksmith (1506-12) 
The early sixteenth-century case of the locksmith Claes Jansz de-
monstrates not only how far the powers reached of a local sheriff and 
bailiff, but also where they ended and whose power was greater than 
theirs8. At the time a certain Jan Gerytsz —as he is called in the archi-
val documents —acted as sheriff of the town of Alkmaar in North 
Holland and as bailiff of the nearby castle De Nyenburg and the 
surrounding rural district (or jurisdiction). Gerytsz was a regional 
dignitary whose grandchildren would adopt the surname of Egmond 
as well as the name of the castle during the later 16th century9. As 
sheriff and bailiff Gerytsz was responsible for public order in the town 
of Alkmaar; he also acted as 'police commissioner', public prosecutor 
in criminal cases, and chairman of the court of the district Nyenburg. 
8 All information about this case comes from Grote Raad van Mechelen 
(further GRM), Dossier Appeals (Beroepen) 683, and verdict of 19 Novem-
ber 1512. The original documents of all cases discussed here can be found in 
the Dutch National Archive/Algemeen Rijksarchief (further ARA) in The 
Hague for the Hoge Raad, and in the Belgian National Archive at Brussels 
for the Grote Raad. Microfilms of all cases can also be consulted at the Lei-
den Institute for Legal History. 
9 For further details about Jan Gerytsz and his family history, see Johan 
BELONJE, "De afkomst van het geslacht Van Egmond van de Nijenburg" in 
Jaarboek van het Centraal Bureau voor Généalogie, 9, 1955, pp. 39-76. 
With thanks to Nico Plomp from the Centraal Bureau voor Généalogie for 
drawing my attention to this publication. 
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In 1505 or 1506 Gerytsz arrested a young locksmith from Alkmaar in 
a most irregular way. Both the locksmith and his father were citizens 
of the town of Alkmaar, holding full civic rights. A year before his 
arrest he had married a girl from a neighbouring village; they found a 
house in town and were well respected locally. Sheriff Gerytsz did not 
hesitate to accost the locksmith outside Alkmaar —and thus outside 
urban territory— when the latter was on a short pilgrimage to a nearby 
monastery together with his pregnant wife and some friends. The she 
riffs assistants attacked the locksmith, knocked him down, hurting his 
shoulder, and locked him up in the dungeons of castle De Nyenburg 
on the charge of theft. 
The sheriffs action was unlawful in several respects. One of the 
most important privileges of a Dutch citizen —an inhabitant of a city 
with full civic rights— and a major form of legal protection against 
intrusive actions by the public authorities was that he or she could not 
be taken into custody without many formalities. The local court had to 
give formal and written permission for the arrest. In this case the 
sheriff had not even requested the court's permission. Moreover, his 
servants maltreated the locksmith, while the sheriff completely ig-
nored the suspect's right to be detained only in his own town unless 
he (or she) was caught in the act or proof could immediately be pro-
duced to show that he or she had indeed committed a crime within the 
relevant territory. None of this applied here —even if we follow the 
sheriffs own story. More was to come. The sheriff refused to release 
the locksmith when bail was offered and —against every rule in the 
book— denied his friends and relatives access to the young man. The 
sheriff further ordered his servants to force entry into the locksmith's 
house and search the premises. Earlier (possibly during the arrest) 
they had already maltreated Claes Jansz's pregnant wife: she mis-
carried. 
According to later depositions by the locksmith, the sheriff con-
tinued to threaten and intimidate him while in detention. Claes Jansz 
refused to admit anything, first because he was not guilty (according 
to his version of the story), and second because he did not want to 
inflict shame on his wife, parents, and friends, "for which reason the 
bailiff behaved in a very rude and threatening way towards 
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Portrait of bailiff Jan Gerytz by Jacob Cornelisz van Oostsanen (c. 
1470-1533). Courtesy of Rijksmuseum Amsterdam. 
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Claes" 1 0. Gerytsz apparently declared that he would not harm the lock-
smith if he admitted certain thefts, adding that "his father was rich 
enough and would have no problem in buying his freedom". The 
sheriff apparently thought that Claes Jansz' well-to-do father would 
not make any problems about paying the so-called compositie —a 
kind of 'legal bribe' which guaranteed that a public prosecutor would 
desist from further prosecution. However, the legal form of composi-
tion (like the legal form of arrest) required formal approval by the 
local court, which had not been requested in this case. 
Composition could be attractive to all parties concerned. The 
money provided a considerable part of a bailiffs or sheriffs income. 
They did not receive any salary from the public treasury and in most 
cases had paid a considerable sum for their office. Composition also 
saved the local courts a lot of work; it was especially useful in those 
cases where the evidence was considerable but insufficient for a con-
viction. Finally, it saved the suspect both the public shame and the 
costs of a court case. In the hands of malevolent prosecutors, however, 
composition could easily become an instrument of blackmail, as is 
evident both from the cases discussed here and from a large number of 
other court cases against civil servants in the archives of the Dutch 
provincial courts and the successive Supreme Courts of the Nether-
lands". 
In spite of the sheriffs threats, the locksmith continued to deny all 
charges and the sheriff decided to apply more pressure. He had the 
locksmith put on the floor of his cell in the castle Nyenburg and in 
person stood on his legs. When this had no result he: 
"had him laid down and bound on a torture bench like a criminal 
with a knotted rope around his brow, another rope across his private 
parts and more elsewhere, with which the aforesaid bailiff and two of 
1 0 The quotations are from GRM Dossier Appeals 683, d. 
1 1 On composition see Lodewijk HOVY, "Schikking in strafzaken in 
Holland tijdens de Republiek" in Scrinium et Scriptum; bundel opstellen 
aangeboden aan J.L. van der Gouw / Nederlands Archievenblad, 84, 1980, 
pp. 413-429; Oscar VAN DEN AREND, Zeven lokale baljuwschappen in 
Holland, Hilversum, Verloren, 1993, pp. 318-319; and for similar practices 
in 15th-century Holland see BLOCKMANS, op. cit. 
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his servants inflicted great pain and persecution on the aforesaid Claes 
without recourse to the law"12. 
Claes Jansz only gave in when the sheriff also threatened to ad-
minister a mixture of "piss and mustard": he admitted a few thefts. 
The sheriff informed the locksmith's father that his son had indeed 
confessed (sending off the message before the actual confession had 
taken place), whereupon some relatives collected and paid the compo-
sition money and the locksmith was released. 
We can only guess at how often such things happened. If the vic-
tims lodged no formal complaint nor took any other type of formal 
action, there is simply no documentation in the archives. I have not 
come across any references to murderous assaults on sheriffs or 
bailiffs in retaliation for their transgressions —which, of course, does 
not mean that this never happened— nor have I found evidence in 
such cases of relatives having recourse to neutral third parties or in-
termediaries. In the present case there is no evidence indicating that 
the locksmith's family encouraged direct political action, stirred up 
local rivalry or rioting, or made use of local factionalism1 3. Most vic-
tims in this position probably chose a low profile —accepting then-
defeat (at least in public), keeping their mouths shut, and avoiding 
further threats and escalation. Some may even have chosen to leave 
town. Legal counter measures were expensive, slow and nerve-
racking. They could also turn out to be dangerous, as we shall see in 
the sequel of this case. The locksmith and his father turned to the pro-
vincial Court of Holland and demanded the annulment of the enforced 
composition, restitution of the money, the payment of damages, and 
public restoration of their honour: they wanted their shame removed. 
As secondary points they requested penal measures against the sheriff: 
he should be reprimanded by his superior (the public prosecutor of the 
1 2 GRM Dossier Appeals 683, d. 
1 3 In some other cases during the same period the parties concerned did 
indeed make use of political means, applied pressure via influential relatives, 
or asked for mediation. See for example, Florike EGMOND & Peter MASON, 
The Mammoth and the Mouse. Microhistory and Morphology, Balti-
more/London, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, esp. pp. 43-66. 
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Court of Holland), who might then institute an investigation into the 
sheriffs actions. 
Although the Court of Holland did not accede to all their wishes it 
was clearly convinced that irregularities had been committed by the 
sheriff. He was called to The Hague (the seat of the provincial court), 
asked to explain his actions, clarify the composition arrangement, and 
present the evidence against the locksmith. The court was not satisfied 
by the sheriffs presentation and formally decided that it would start a 
new investigation of its own. Of course, this was not in the sheriffs 
interests. He lodged an appeal against the decision of the Court of 
Holland and thus took matters to the Supreme Court of the Northern 
and Southern Netherlands, the Grote Raad van Mechelen. 
Taking into consideration both the contents of the remaining 
dossiers and the decision of the Court of Holland, it looks as if the 
locksmith and his relatives had a strong case. The sheriff therefore 
risked losing a considerable sum of money (composition money, 
damages and probably a fine), as well as his honour, status and 
authority as a public official. Again he had recourse to violence. In 
December 1507 the locksmith and some of his friends and relatives 
were visiting another relative in the small village of Oudorp (his 
wife's place of birth). Perhaps it was St. Nicholas or Christmas. At 
any rate, there were some festivities and people were singing and 
drinking. In the midst of this the sheriff and two of his servants forced 
their way into the house to arrest the locksmith once more. A general 
fight ensued, during which the locksmith and a friend managed to 
crawl out of a window and escape. They suffered only some bruises 
and one of their cloaks was torn, but Claes Jansz' uncle lost three of 
his fingers and was on the brink of death for days on account of a stab 
in the neck. All the furniture was smashed and some of Claes' friends 
had been beaten up. 
Naturally the locksmith immediately informed the Grote Raad at 
Malines. It ordered the sheriff to immediately cease his aggressive 
behaviour. The locksmith thereupon increased his demands: besides a 
public apology and restoration of honour he now also wanted the very 
large sum of 100 Flemish pounds and 100 gold crowns in compensa-
tion, "considering that he Claes Jansz did not want to be ever again in 
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such horrible danger and fear". To these 'civil' demands he added a 
'criminal' one: the locksmith requested that the Grote Raad would 
have the sheriff decapitated or else that he be condemned to the pay-
ment of 4000 florins in fines; he should moreover be barred from any 
further public office and lose his job. The sheriff, on the contrary, 
asserted his right to arrest a person who was at that moment within his 
jurisdiction and was a self-confessed thief, arguing that the locksmith 
had committed some further thefts after his previous detention. 
According to the sheriff, the locksmith had even committed sacrilege 
by stealing a silver-plated hand with relics from the Carmelite monas-
tery at Oudorp. The wounds and damages incurred during the fight 
were merely the result of the violent resistance put up by Claes and 
his friends. Since he (the sheriff) was only prosecuting the new crimes 
committed by Claes, there was no possibility, moreover, of his 
obstructing the ongoing court case concerning the old accusations. 
We cannot know whether Claes had really committed any thefts, 
but we may assume that an accusation of theft was especially dama-
ging for a locksmith. He, after all, was the 'key' figure where the sa-
fety of the town and its inhabitants was concerned. If he could not be 
trusted, what was one to think of the security of the city gates, the 
prison, and the town government's coffer. Private houses and pro-
perty, secrets and precious objects were all accessible to a locksmith. 
Much more depended on his reliability, therefore, than just his indivi-
dual reputation. Perhaps the sheriff had fabricated the charge of theft 
precisely for this reason, trying to hurt the locksmith where he was 
most vulnerable. But it is not unthinkable either that Claes Jansz had 
really betrayed the public trust put in him and had abused his pro-
fessional skills. Claes Jansz may also have discovered (through his 
profession and trusted position) some of the sheriffs secrets or past 
illegal practices, which had then forced the sheriff into self-protective 
action by means of false accusations1 4. 
1 4 With thanks to Jos de Jong, who drew my attention to the special posi-
tion of locksmiths and to A.P.A. VAN DAALEN, "Slotenmakers in Delft. Hoe 
het de gildebroeders van Sint Eloi verging" in Open Slot: sluitwerk en slo-
tenmakers in Nederland uit de 15e tot de 19e eeuw, Groningen, Wolters 
Noordhoff/Forsten, 1986, pp. 73-91. 
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So much is clear: both the Court of Holland and the Grote Raad 
had no doubt that the sheriff was taking things much too far. It took 
the Grote Raad five more years to pronounce a final verdict, which 
was in favour of the locksmith in almost every respect but provided no 
clarity whatsoever about the thefts. The Grote Raad stated that the 
sheriff had used excessive violence and imposed a fine of 400 Carolus 
florins (to be paid to the Grote Raad itself), as well as damages of 200 
Flemish pounds to be paid to Claes Jansz. The sheriff also had to pay 
the by no means inconsiderable legal costs, but he kept his job. In fact, 
this nasty incident does not even seem to have tarnished his reputa-
tion: the sheriff died in Alkmaar in 1523 a well-respected man, who 
had been sheriff and mayor of his town for decades. His fourth son 
succeeded him as town sheriff and many of his seventeen children 
occupied influential positions. In the long run Jan Gerytsz became the 
ancestor of one of the most influential families in the province of Ho-
lland during the 17th and 18th centuries. In the course of the 16th 
century his children and grandchildren adopted the names of Egmond 
and Nijenburg as their family names —without any clear right to ei-
ther. Rightly or wrongly, they regarded themselves as illegitimate 
descendants of the counts of Egmond and adopted their family wea-
pon, albeit with a bend indicating illegitimacy. Jan Gerytsz' grandson 
Diederick van Egmond van den Nijenburg (1537-1596) not only for-
malised the use of this double surname, but in 1582 also surrepti-
tiously removed the bend from the coat of arms, thus successfully 
proclaiming himself a nobleman. Ironically, Diederick eventually 
became a councillor of the provincial Court of Holland, which had 
sentenced his own grandfather some sixty years earlier, and even rea-
ched the highest legal position in the new Dutch Republic: he became 
president of the Supreme Court, the Hoge Raad (1592-1596)". 
The case of the harassed locksmith shows how extremely thin the 
borderline was between legal composition and illegal extortion by 
sheriffs and bailiffs. Moreover, even when extortion or blackmail 
could be proven it might take years before sanctions were imposed. 
Those sanctions were generally less than drastic. Furthermore, this 
case shows that the discretionary powers of sheriffs and bailiffs —on 
whether or not to institute formal legal proceedings— were enormous, 
1 5 See BELONJE, op. cit., esp. p. 55. 
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even where urban citizens with full civic rights and a good reputation 
were concerned. Bailiffs and sheriff obviously could and did use their 
assistants as hired thugs —which is perhaps less surprising when we 
know that they hired and paid these servants themselves. Finally, even 
those citizens with full civic rights could only protect themselves 
against abuse of power by such officials if they were strong, wealthy, 
and smart enough, and if they could rely on the support of friends and 
relatives. If Claes Jansz had not been a young man who could rely 
upon his father's and friends' physical, moral and financial assistance, 
he would not have stood a chance against this sheriff, nor would he 
have dared to take legal action. 
3. A farmer steals back his own cattle (1552-54); an extortionist 
bailiff (1691-92) 
These conclusions are supported by various other cases in the ar-
chives of the successive supreme courts of the Netherlands. Two short 
examples indicate how much (or how little) could be reached by pri-
vate citizens intimidated by a sheriff. In 1552 sheriff Lubert Aelkens 
of the small town of Weesp (to the east of Amsterdam) confiscated 
fourteen cows and two horses in payment for debts incurred by the 
farmer Jan Gielisz from the neighbouring village of Weesperkarspel 1 6. 
The sheriff organised a public auction in which he himself was the 
only bidder -because it took place when most villagers were in 
church. Thus the sheriff became the new owner of the cows and 
horses, having paid only a minimal sum which just covered the 
farmer's debts. The sheriff thereupon ordered his assistants to take the 
animals to the cattle market in a nearby town, but the farmer and his 
relatives and local friends —who by then realized what happened— 
blocked their way, beat up the sheriffs assistants and started a riot "in 
such a way that the whole town is in great commotion". They recap-
tured the animals and threw stones at the members of the local court. 
This could not but lead to criminal charges, which were soon dealt 
with in an appeal case by the provincial court of Holland. Heavy 
penalties were demanded: the farmer was to be decapitated and his 
possessions confiscated. None of this actually happened. The farmer 
1 6 For all information about this case see GRM Verdict 2255, 28 March 
1556. 
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and his relatives and friends managed to inform the provincial court 
about the local background of the case and this completely turned the 
tables. 
The local information made clear that farmer Gielisz was not quite 
right in the head. Ten years earlier, in 1542, he had formally been 
made a ward on account of his limited mental capacities and his fits of 
madness. He was not allowed to incur debts or commit any financial 
transactions unless his guardians, relatives or close friends approved. 
Everyone in the small town of Weesp was well aware of this, inclu-
ding sheriff Aelkens. There was something more, however. It turned 
out that the farmer had incurred his debts in an inn owned by the she-
riff himself: it had been sheriff Aelkens who had sold him drink on 
credit. Only Aelkens could estimate how much the farmer had actua-
lly been drinking and how high his debts were. Finally, the way in 
which the sheriff had impounded the farmer's animals looked like a 
well-planned assault and robbery rather than legal action. Therefore 
the Court of Holland ordered a new and independent investigation into 
the facts. It eventually decided completely in favour of the farmer in 
March 1553. He was cleared of all charges, while the sheriffs supe-
rior —the bailiff of the region of Gooiland, who had been acting as 
public prosecutor on behalf of the sheriff in the criminal case against 
the farmer— had to pay all legal costs. 
All in all, it seems no more than a trivial case in which the greed of 
a local sheriff threatened to harm a local inhabitant with limited men-
tal capacities. To the farmer in question it would not have looked like 
a trivial case, however. After all, he was at some point in danger of 
losing both his head and his possessions. For several years, moreover, 
this minor case caused serious problems for both parties. The final 
defeat of the sheriff and his superior the bailiff made them both lose 
prestige, and the financial consequences continued to trouble the 
bailiffs children for years. Just like the Alkmaar locksmith, the far-
mer only managed to win his case thanks to the physical and moral 
support of his friends and relatives. After all, if their violent behaviour 
had not (unintentionally) turned the case into a criminal one and the-
reby taken it out of the local domain, it would have remained within 
the territory and control of the local sheriff. The farmer would not 
have had much of a chance. 
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The huge latitude enjoyed by corrupt high officials in the Dutch 
Republic is even more painfully clear in the case of the Rotterdam 
bailiff Jacob van Zuijlen van Nyevelt. The Hoge Raad tried him in 
1691-92 for large-scale fraud, corruption, abuse of power, and nu-
merous other misdeeds. The impressive indictment covers sixty cri-
mina —all of them described in some detail— including lese majesty, 
extortion and blackmail, illegal detention, illegal and secret composi-
tion in several adultery and rape cases, besides forgery and theft. It is 
more than likely that these sixty crimina formed just the tip of the 
iceberg. Since early modern criminal justice generally operated in an 
"exemplary" way, we may assume that the charges in this bailiffs 
case covered only those misdeeds for which the prosecutor (the pro-
cureur-general of the Hoge Raad) could expect a conviction with 
some confidence, and which were regarded as the most serious given 
the defendant's public function. The list is therefore important be-
cause it presents us with a virtual pattern-book of the types of misdeed 
that could be committed by a public prosecutor. The large number 
alone of the crimes mentioned in this list also shows that the misrule 
of this bailiff was not a matter of weeks or months, but of years. That 
again implies that the victims of these sixty crimes had not received 
any satisfaction, compensation, restoration of their honour, or 
damages until the moment when these combined charges were 
brought against the bailiff. 
Even then there was no justice for them. The indictment cannot tell 
us whether the Rotterdam bailiff had really committed all these 
crimes, but the special character of this lengthy document does reveal 
something of what happened behind the closed doors of the meetings 
of the Hoge Raad. Because the document reveals the opinion of each 
councillor for each of the sixty crimina, we can reconstruct per crime 
how many councillors regarded the bailiff as guilty. The records of the 
final deliberations of the councillors reveal that at least two out of the 
eight councillors regarded bailiff Van Zuylen van Nyevelt as guilty of 
a very large number of crimes and pleaded for bis conviction. One of 
them even demanded capital punishment. The majority of six, 
however, thought that proof was insufficient, and the bailiff was dis-
charged —in spite of the fact that each of the councillors regarded him 
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as guilty of at least several of the crimina". There was nothing fortui-
tous about this favourable verdict for the bailiff, as we can find out not 
from these judicial records but also from publications about the his-
tory of Rotterdam. Van Zuylen van Nyevelt was one of the personal 
clients of stadholder Prince Willem III of Orange, who continued to 
support him through thick and thin. The Rotterdam population rioted 
and plundered the bailiffs house, while libellous poems appeared and 
the Rotterdam town council even suspended the bailiff from his post. 
All was to no avail. It was the prince's influence that inspired the 
Hoge Raad's final sentence and cleared the bailiff. What is more, the 
Rotterdam town council had to reinstate the bailiff in his former office 
and pay him an enormous sum in damages, after which Van Zuylen 
van Nyevelt managed to place some of his friends and relatives in 
attractive and influential positions. Even then he was not satisfied: the 
bailiff eventually managed to politically eliminate most of his former 
enemies within the Rotterdam city government1 8. 
These two examples show what few practical means were at the 
disposal of the highest courts in the Netherlands (the provincial court 
of Holland, the Grote Raad van Mechelen and its successor the Hoge 
Raad) to curb physical intimidation, extortion and similar practices by 
local bailiffs and sheriffs19. In this respect nothing much appears to 
have changed during the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries. That in itself 
may seem surprising, because it implies that the formation of the 
Dutch State (and the institution of a new supreme court for the 
1 7 See Hoge Raad (further HR), Collection Grande Book 11, deliberations 
and verdict of 27 May 1692. 
1 8 The case is notorious. See Arie VAN DER SCHOOR, Stad in Aanwas. 
Geschiedenis van Rotterdam tot 1813, Zwolle, Waanders, 1999, pp. 279-282. 
[With thanks to Jos de Jong for the reference.] For an example of a case 
against a 17th-century autocratic bailiff that did end disastrously for the 
bailiff, see Martinus Antonius Maria FRANKEN, Schandalen uit Apeldoorns 
verleden, Zaltbommel, Europese Bibliotheek, 1993, pp. 11-30. 
1 9 Further examples tried by the Hoge Raad can be found in ARA, Hoge 
Raad Collection Grande. See also the excerpts from criminal cases tried by 
the Hoge Raad published by J. C. GIJSBERTI HODENPIJL, "Extracten uit de 
crimineele ordonnantien van Holland" in De Navorscher, 1894, pp. 321-333; 
1895, pp. 185-197; 1896, pp. 462-475; 1898, pp. 449-457; and 1899, pp. 40-
45, 229-232,349-353,439-442, 543-548. 
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northern Dutch provinces in 1582) did not make any difference at all. 
The three following examples will show, however, that there were 
indeed some changes, in particular with respect to specific categories 
of defendants. These developments were closely connected with 
changes in the complicated configuration of power involving the al-
most independent local criminal courts of the Dutch Republic, the 
higher provincial courts, and the newly created supreme court (the 
Hoge Raad). The mere fact of the latter's geographical proximity —it 
was based in The Hague, as compared to the former Grote Raad at 
Mechelen— enabled it to impose its presence, but the Hoge Raad first 
had to justify its position and show what is was worth. It had to 
demonstrate its authority, which was never uncontested during the 
first century of its existence. 
4. A woman demands restoration of her honour (1592) 
Surely one of the most miserable situations to find oneself in 
during the 16th or 17th centuries was to be suspected of sorcery. This 
happened to a woman by the name of Neeltjen Andries in the small 
town of Schiedam not far from Rotterdam. She had been living there 
for at least three decades. She and her husband owned a timber busi-
ness. Although she had a good reputation in town and was known to 
be "a woman of honour" who always frequented "people of quality", 
the rumour that she was a sorceress went around for several years. In 
1587, therefore, Neeltjen herself turned to the town court requesting 
formal proceedings to clear her name. She "staked her reputation", 
which meant that the court invited any person who knew of any evi-
dence against her to come forth and produce it publicly in front of the 
court2 0. 
A court could only initiate such a procedure at the request of a pri-
vate citizen. It offered such ordinary persons a weapon in a delicate 
situation in which no formal complaints or charges had been made, 
but serious damage to a person's reputation was already being done. 
2 0 All information about this case can be found (unless indicated other-
wise) in HR Collection Grande Book 3, 4 March 1592. For further informa-
tion see Hans de WAARDT, Toverij en samenleving. Holland 1500-1800, 
Rotterdam, s.n., 1991. 
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To a certain extent it enabled a 'suspect' to pre-empt (criminal) legal 
proceedings by means of starting (another type of) juridical action. 
The immediate goal of such a "purge " or "cleansing" was rehabilita-
tion, but the final, even more important purpose was not to have to 
appear in dock as a suspect in a witch trial. If no persons came forth 
and no evidence was produced, the 'suspect's ' reputation was thereby 
cleared and any person who subsequently spread rumours could be 
criminally prosecuted2 1. 
It was a risky procedure, however, which could easily and disas-
trously turn against the person who had initiated it. Those who re-
quested such a procedure in connection with accusations of witchcraft 
or sorcery could become the suspects in a judicial investigation that 
might easily turn into in a criminal trial. Moreover, during the period 
in which witnesses could come forth, the 'suspect' was usually taken 
into custody. Even a short stay in prison entailed health risks, but this 
was a minor problem compared with the chance that someone might 
indeed come forth with evidence that triggered formal questioning or 
even interrogation under torture. Everyone knew where such interro-
gations could lead: death by fire or water. Only someone for whom 
the clearing of name and reputation (and the regaining of a former 
respected social position) was literally a matter of life and death 
would take such risks. So much is obvious from the very small num-
ber of such proceedings in the archives. For the province of Holland 
only 24 such cases concerning sorcery and witchcraft are known for 
the whole of the period between 1500 and 1800. A large part of those 
occurred during the years 1580-1600, the heyday of the witch trials in 
the Northern Netherlands 2 2. 
2 1 A similar type of procedure is described in Jose PARDO TOMAS, "Phy-
sicians' and inquisitors' stories? Circumcision and crypto-Judaism in Spain, 
16th-18th centuries" in Florike EGMOND & Robert ZWIJNENBERG (eds.), 
Bodily Extremities. Preoccupations with the human body in Early Modern 
European Culture (forthcoming, Aldershot, 2002). 
2 2 For the whole of the province of Holland we know of 103 trials for 
witchcraft or sorcery, of which 37 ended in capital sentences. Of these 103 
cases 33 (with 15 capital sentences) occurred between 1580 en 1600. See DE 
WAARDT, op. cit, p. 283. 
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Apparently no one approached the court of Schiedam in 1587. 
Therefore it declared Neeltjen to be "pure, clean and innocent of the 
alleged sorcery" and it announced that anyone who would hereafter 
continue to spread rumours could count on a fine as well as further 
punishment. Normally, this would have been enough, but in Neelt-
jen 's case it did not help. The rumours continued and even increased 
in the course of the next few years. Neeltjen decided that she had to 
repeat her previous measures, but at a higher level. At the end of 1591 
she went straight to the provincial court of Holland2 3. At that moment 
Neeltjen must have been confronted by an impossible choice: either to 
take the initiative herself to start a procedure to clear her reputation 
once more, or to wait, thereby losing the initiative and running the risk 
that the local sheriff might start a criminal investigation after all. She 
must have imagined that the latter tactic was more dangerous — 
probably rightly so, because during the last two decades of the 16th 
century the small town of Schiedam was the epicentre from which 
waves of witchcraft and sorcery accusations and trials spread through 
Holland. Just a few years earlier, in 1585, four women had been tried 
for witchcraft and sentenced to death in Schiedam. And the immediate 
cause of Neeltjen's second procedure to clear her name was the 
confession of yet another woman who had been arrested for sorcery in 
January 1591 in Schiedam (she hanged herself in her cell) 2 4. 
From the start everything seemed to go wrong in this second pro-
cedure. When Neeltjen presented herself to the Court of Holland, it 
refused her request to be released as soon as possible and declared that 
she was to remain in custody during the whole of the procedure. 
Moreover, her case almost immediately changed into an active crimi-
nal investigation following the so-called "ordinary procedure" (about 
which more later). Instead of waiting for witnesses to come forward, 
the prosecutor-general of the provincial Court (acting as public prose-
cutor) and the local sheriff of Schiedam did their best to gather evi-
dence against Neeltjen Andries. Besides the accusations by two local 
women who had already been sentenced themselves for witchcraft and 
named Neeltjen as an accomplice, they gathered a further nine in-
2 3 Strictly speaking the provincial court of Holland was the only court in 
Holland with full powers to carry out such a rehabilitation. 
2 4 See DE WAARDT, op. at, pp. 99-101. 
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criminating depositions. Neeltjen Andries and her 'accomplice' 
Maritjen were accused of all kinds of sorcery. It was said, for instance, 
that Neeltjen had made several maidservants in her quarter ill by 
means of sorcery (one of them vomited fish, nails, and knives). She 
had committed "other horrible spooky acts", caused numerous small 
domestic items to disappear in neighbouring houses, and had even 
caused a shipwreck because the captain refused to give her a lift to the 
port in his cart. Moreover, Neeltjen had been observed dancing at 
night on a local meadow together with invisible devilish companions. 
[The dossiers do not make it clear how the witnesses observed these 
invisible companions.] 
To counter these accusations Neeltjen and her lawyer brought to-
gether 42 favourable depositions which attested to her excellent repu-
tation, good name, good behaviour, and innocence as regards sorcery. 
Several of these depositions were signed by prominent local inhabi-
tants, such as the mayor and other notables. Nonetheless the Court of 
Holland judged that the depositions against Neeltjen and her friend 
Maritjen were serious enough to warrant interrogation under torture 
and in February 1592 the Court gave formal permission for that 
interrogation to be carried out. Neeltjen and her lawyer decided to 
appeal against this sentence and took their case to the Hoge Raad. 
This was the crucial moment: there was not much of a chance that she 
would be able to withstand torture without confessing, while a con-
fession in such a case could mean only one thing: capital punishment. 
The months that Neeltjen spent in detention waiting for the decision 
of the Hoge Raad must have been horrible. The decision finally came 
in June 1592, but was by no means straightforward. The Hoge Raad 
neither confirmed nor nullified the provincial court's torture sentence, 
but ordered a new and independent investigation at the local level: 
"not only concerning the things related in the dossiers, but also con-
cerning all circumstances they might come across at their discretion, 
which may serve as evidence against or in favour of the defendant and 
thus will serve to uncover the truth in this case". Neeltjen remained in 
prison, waiting for an even longer period. During the summer holidays 
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of 1592 two delegates from the Hoge Raad went to Schiedam and 
interrogated a large number of local inhabitants2 5. 
Until the summer of 1593, when Neeltjen had spent more than 18 
months in detention, it was unclear whether she would be tortured 
after all. During this period her husband died. The local sheriff did his 
utmost to obstruct the usual division of the couple's joint property and 
even tried to have it impounded —as if Neeltjen had already been 
found guilty. Finally, on 13 July 1593 the Hoge Raad pronounced its 
final verdict. It annulled the torture sentence of the provincial court, 
stated that Neeltjen was completely innocent of all crimes with which 
she had been charged by the sheriff of Schiedam and the prosecutor 
general, and released her from detention. The two prosecutors had to 
pay all legal costs. The court's verdict could hardly have been more 
unequivocal: Neeltjen was completely innocent and her name was 
cleared for ever. 
Two 'para-juridical' aspects of this case deserve special attention: 
Neeltjen's social position and the political implications of the verdict. 
Like the locksmith from Alkmaar and the farmer from Weesp, Neelt-
jen would have had very little chance of standing up to the prosecutors 
had she not been supported by friends and relatives. Had she been a 
poor widow without 42 witnesses willing to testify to her good repu-
tation, and had many of these witnesses not been prominent local in-
habitants, the Court of Holland would no doubt have resorted to tor-
ture much sooner; and that would have almost certainly precluded the 
chances of a new investigation and eventually of a favourable verdict 
and release from detention2 6. 
The 'political dimensions' of this case call for some further explo-
ration —especially given the considerable effects of the Hoge Raad's 
verdict, which went far beyond this particular case 2 7. If we take into 
2 5 The term summer holiday (zomervakantie) literally occurs in the archi-
val documents. 
2 6 See also the conclusions of DE WAARDT, op. ext., pp. 104-105. 
2 7 Because they contain these brief summaries of the councillors' delibera-
tions, the archives of the Hoge Raad are an extremely rare exception among 
the legal archives of early modem Continental Europe. Normally no delibera-
tions or motivations of verdicts can be found at all. In Neeltjen's case such 
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account how much time the new investigation and further delibera-
tions of the Hoge Raad took (almost a year) and note that during this 
same period several local courts in the province of Holland refrained 
from pronouncing verdicts in cases of sorcery or witchcraft until they 
had learnt the Hoge Raad's verdict, we cannot but infer that Hoge 
Raad was well aware of the importance of its verdict and realised that 
it might set a precedent. Without so much as a hint of an opinion as to 
whether sorcery or witchcraft really existed, the Hoge Raad's verdict 
implied that any future decision by any court in the province of 
Holland to apply torture in such cases would be liable to appeal. That 
would mean lengthy new investigations, which entailed delays as well 
as considerable extra costs that pleased nobody. Whether intentionally 
or not, the verdict in Neeltjen's case effectively blocked further capital 
sentences in trials for sorcery or witchcraft all over the province of 
Holland. After all, a capital sentence could only be imposed upon 
confession. Unless a defendant confessed to sorcery or witchcraft 
without being tortured, the criminal courts of Holland had no choice 
but to impose less severe punishment, invent a new charge, or cease 
prosecution. This is exactly what happened. Neeltjen's case was not 
the last trial for sorcery or witchcraft in Holland, but except for one 
trial in 1614 none of these cases ended in capital punishment 2 8. 
The intervention by the Hoge Raad thus considerably increased the 
legal rights of defendants in such trials and raised a major obstruction 
to the criminal prosecution of sorcery and witchcraft. It seems un-
likely that this was just a chance side-effect. After all, the Hoge Raad 
could easily have decided otherwise: it might just as well have con-
firmed or annulled the previous decision by the provincial Court of 
Holland. The former would have led to torture and a probable capital 
sentence by the provincial court, the latter to Neeltjen's release from 
detention but without any new investigation. It looks very much as if 
the Hoge Raad did not wish to limit itself to just a procedural verdict 
and ordered a new investigation regarding the facts of the case pre-
cisely because this gave it an instrument to stop or at least obstruct the 
information is minimal, however, and limited to the question of whether a 
new investigation should be ordered. 
2 8 See DE WAARDT, op. cit., pp. 100-101. 
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tendency of some local courts to start new witch trials 2 9. There is a 
good chance that political considerations played a part in this (pre-
sumed) policy, and it cannot be a coincidence that the Hoge Raad 
pronounced such a far-reaching verdict precisely in the first phase of 
its existence —only ten years after it was created (in 1582) as one of 
the symbols of the new Dutch Republic— when the scope of its ver-
dicts and the power relations with the technically less powerful but 
much older and prestigious provincial Court of Holland had not yet 
been clearly defined. Perhaps the Hoge Raad made an astute use of 
this opportunity to set a precedent, enhance its own prestige, challenge 
the power of the provincial court of Holland, and cut the costs of 
witch trials in Holland. Who knows, even humanitarian motives with 
respect to defendants suspected of witchcraft or sorcery may have 
played a part. 
5. A bailiff gets into trouble (1609-1610); a bandit lodges an appeal 
(1717-18) 
Such speculations are not that far-fetched when we look at two 
more cases in which the Hoge Raad pronounced verdicts that clearly 
contained a political message for the other Dutch courts and entailed 
changes both with respect to prosecution policies and the rights of 
defendants. In 1609 bailiff Jacob de Witte of the town of Goes near 
Middelburg in Zealand was shocked to find himself a suspect in a 
criminal case before the Court of Holland that was taking the shape of 
an extraordinary trial (a common type of procedure to which we will 
come back later). The bailiffs 'crimes' as well as his trial were 
closely intertwined with local factional strife involving both religious 
and political issues. According to the court's prosecutor De Witte had 
made no attempt whatsoever to prevent or impede the distribution of 
seditious pamphlets in his home town, and he was even suspected of 
having spread slanderous rumours himself implicating the members of 
one of the local factions. Complaints about his behaviour had reached 
the provincial Court (which at the time dealt with both Holland and 
2 9 Such a local tendency to conduct trials for witchchraft and sorcery does 
not, in my opinion, conflict with a tendency at the provincial or national level 
to curb such trials. At these different judicial levels different considerations 
played a part in determining prosecution policies. 
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Zealand) which ordered an investigation. In an unguarded moment the 
bailiff apparently admitted that he had indeed made some negative 
remarks about certain members of the local government and had ne-
glected to confiscate some seditious pamphlets. According to the 
prosecutor general this was tantamount to a formal confession. The 
provincial Court shared his opinion and condemned the bailiff in De-
cember 1609 to a heavy penalty: he was suspended forever from his 
office, banished from the town of Goes for the duration of six years, 
and ordered to pay a heavy fine of 1000 pounds as well as legal costs. 
The bailiff wanted to lodge an appeal with the Hoge Raad against 
the provincial court's verdict. The problem was that Dutch criminal 
law did not allow an appeal against a verdict in a criminal case of the 
"extraordinary" type if the defendant had indeed confessed. And that 
was precisely the issue here. Had he confessed or not? 3 0. The bailiff 
argued that he had been tricked. Whatever the case may have been, a 
majority of the members of the Hoge Raad took his side and granted 
him the right to lodge an appeal. Naturally, the provincial court pro-
tested and regarded this as an infringement of its rights. It made it 
clear that it regarded the case of the bailiff as a test case for the rela-
tions between the provincial court and the Hoge Raad. If the latter did 
indeed allow an appeal, this would create a precedent: an appeal might 
become possible in all similar future cases of the extraordinary type 
(the bulk of all criminal cases in the Dutch Republic) in which a con-
fession had been made. This alone was bad enough. The provincial 
court was even more upset by the fact that the Hoge Raad's positive 
decision about the appeal directly seemed to threaten the provincial 
3 0 Unless indicated otherwise, all information about the case against bailiff 
De Witte comes from HR Collection Grande Book 5, 11 December 1609-30 
July 1611. For an example of a fraudulent official who committed perjury as 
well, was barred from office, and lodged an appeal, see Arend H. HUUSSEN 
jr. and Barendina Sijtje HEMPENIUS-VAN DIJK, "Rechtsbescherming van 
individu en ambtenaar tijdens de Opstand: de evocatie van de procedure 
tegen grietman mr. Pilgrum ten Indijck voor het Hof van Friesland naar de 
Grote Raad van Mechelen, 1572-1575" in Hugo SOLY and René VERMEIR 
(eds.), Beleid en bestuur in de oude Nederlanden. Liber amicorum prof. dr. 
M. Baelde, Gent, RUG.Vakgroep Nieuwe geschiedenis, 1993, pp. 205-216 
(which mainly focuses, however, on the technical aspects of this case). In this 
case too protection and politics played an important part. 
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court's own authority, autonomy and honour, while indirectly 
jeopardising the near autonomy of the local criminal courts in the 
provinces of Holland and Zealand. From this moment on —it was 
thought— each and every verdict in a criminal case of the extraordi-
nary type could be open to appeal and therefore to interference by the 
Hoge Raad. For that reason the Court sent a lengthy written protest 
not only to the Hoge Raad but also to the relevant political authorities, 
the Provincial Estates of Zealand3 1. A decision would have to be taken 
at the political level to break the deadlock. 
A protracted round of negotiations, discussions, protests and 
meetings followed, during which poor bailiff Witte was all but for-
gotten. Tempers ran high. In order to pacify the parties involved the 
provincial politicians emphasised "that the honour and authority of 
both courts were of close concern to them" 3 2. In February 1610 the 
Hoge Raad decided to send one of its councillors as a delegate to the 
official meeting of the Estates of Zealand in order to present them 
with a detailed explanation of the reasons why the Hoge Raad had 
decided in favour of the bailiffs appeal. The councillor emphasised 
that the Hoge Raad certainly did not try to create a precedent, but con-
sidered that appeal should be allowed only in some exceptional cases: 
i.e. if there were reasons to assume that a confession had not been a 
real confession, or if the wrong type of procedure had been followed. 
However politely formulated, the message was that the Hoge Raad 
considered the provincial Court's investigation into the bailiffs case 
faulty and incomplete. It emphasised that no additional evidence had 
been produced by the provincial prosecutor apart from this so-called 
confession. Since this was a clearly political trial, instigated by mem-
bers of one of the local factions, the Hoge Raad may have had good 
reason to doubt the quality of the investigation, the strength of the 
3 1 The way in which the Hoge Raad reacted clearly indicates that we are 
dealing here with a power conflict. The Hoge Raad immediately sent a letter 
of its own to the provincial estates of Zealand, indicating politely but very 
clearly that the Hoge Raad did not wish to be obstructed. It trusted that the 
estates of Zealand would do nothing to impede "good justice" or to 
jeopardize "our jurisdiction or our reputation" (letter of 23 January 1610). 
3 2 My emphasis. 
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evidence and —by implication— the impartiality of the provincial 
court. We cannot even exclude the possibility that certain councillors 
of the provincial court were themselves implicated in the factional 
strife that lay behind the original conflict and charge 3 3. In a malicious 
aside the Hoge Raad also pointed out that the provincial court itself 
made no bones about interfering (against the rules) in the criminal 
cases of the local criminal courts if that served the provincial court's 
own interests. It even allowed appeal in extraordinary cases as long at 
it was an appeal to itself and against the local courts 3 4. 
The bailiff was lucky: the Estates of Zealand approved his appeal 
to the Hoge Raad, and in July 1610 it decided that the previous proce-
dure had indeed been faulty. It partially annulled the provincial court's 
sentence: the bailiff did not have to pay the fine, nor was he banished 
for six years, but he still lost his job. Perhaps that was not a bad deci-
sion: it is hard to imagine a situation in which working relations had 
been more structurally disrupted. The case of bailiff Witte sprang 
from factional strife in Zealand and ended in The Hague amidst politi-
cal and judicial rivalry. Nothing but a political decision could have 
broken the stalemate between provincial court and Hoge Raad. 
The extent and weight of the political considerations in this case 
are nicely demonstrated by the Hoge Raad's justification to the Es-
tates of Zealand. Referring to the great importance of civic rights "for 
protecting subjects against oppression" and "protecting the liberty and 
welfare of the nation", the Hoge Raad argued that both the provincial 
court of Holland and Zealand and the Hoge Raad itself realised the 
great danger of a situation in which private citizens had no choice but 
to submit to the verdicts of local criminal courts without possibility of 
redress and without the possibility of calling the latter to account. 
3 3 Further research might clarify whether the political alliances of the 
court's councillors may have influenced this verdict. 
3 4 It was indeed true, the Hoge Raad continued, that a further treaty 
between the provincial estates of Holland and those of Zealand had laid down 
that the Hoge Raad should not allow an appeal in "extraordinary cases in 
which the defendant had confessed", but this (it maintained) applied only to 
sentences pronounced by the town courts of Zealand and not to those pro-
nounced by the provincial court itself. 
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Moreover, the Hoge Raad continued, each and every lawyer was 
aware of the fact 
"that every case can easily be changed into a criminal one [...] 
even though it may be intrinsically a civil matter [...] only to execute 
the sentences promptly and prevent further legal action and the 
spreading of information [...]; that many faults and miscarriages of 
justice are caused by the animosity or high-handedness of those in 
charge of criminal prosecution, or on the contrary by their lack of ini-
tiative or laziness, while they should in fact act judiciously, with dis-
cretion, lenience, and without haste". 
This statement by the Hoge Raad contains a devastating criticism 
of current criminal justice and procedure. Apparently each and every 
case —even the most obviously "civil" ones— could easily be turned 
into a criminal one, thus (in nearly all cases) blocking appeal and the 
restraints of a possible check by a higher court; furthermore, the bias, 
corruption, haste and incompetence of the local criminal courts caused 
grave mistakes in criminal procedures. 
It would be unwarranted to doubt the Hoge Raad's sincere concern 
for the welfare and rights of private citizens, but we should not ignore 
the fact that this plea for further checks on the prosecutions by all 
inferior criminal courts also furthered the Hoge Raad's own interests. 
While the provincial court's jurisdiction was limited to Holland and 
Zealand, the Hoge Raad was closely connected with the national 
government of the Dutch Republic, but encountered grave problems in 
having its authority recognised by the Dutch provinces outside 
Holland and Zealand, and therefore saw its effective powers limited to 
the same two provinces where the provincial court ruled. Effectively 
this turned the two courts into rivals —a situation that proved to be in 
the defendant's interest in this case. 
The Court of Holland need not have feared: the bailiffs case did 
not set a precedent. Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries it re-
mained nearly impossible to appeal from a verdict based upon con-
fession in a criminal case of the extraordinary type. Almost a century 
after the bailiffs case, in 1718, the few procedural gaps that still 
allowed some exceptions to this rule were closed by the so-called 
Edictum Jacotianum —again for predominantly political reasons. In 
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that year the most famous bandit of the Netherlands, Jacob Frederik 
Muller alias Jaco, almost escaped the "punishment due to him" be-
cause of a legal loophole3 5. Jaco's gang had committed a long series of 
assaults, armed robberies, and some murders and rapes. There was no 
lack of evidence, and a considerable number of his accomplices had 
been sentenced by the time Jaco himself was arrested. Although the 
depositions of his accomplices left no doubt about Jaco's own in-
volvement in a series of major crimes, Jaco denied everything and 
continued to do so even under torture. This left the Amsterdam town 
court no choice— that is, following a strict interpretation of the proce-
dural rules —but to impose a relatively mild punishment. Corporal 
punishment on the scaffold was out of the question, because it could 
only be imposed if the defendant had confessed. However, very few 
Dutch courts adhered to this strict interpretation of the rule. 
Usually more "creative" solutions were thought up: it was possible 
to either reformulate the charge, which created a new opportunity to 
still impose the intended punishment, or change the type of criminal 
procedure from an extraordinary to an ordinary one, which triggered 
a new trial. The latter in a way rewarded the defendant for his perse-
verance and physical hardiness, since he (I have not come across a 
she) 'earned' an ordinary criminal trial which entailed the right to 
both legal defence and a possible appeal. This is what happened in 
Jaco's case. In 1717 the Amsterdam town court finally sentenced Jaco 
in an ordinary trial to the most severe form of capital punishment 
known at the time: breaking on the wheel. However, to the great 
consternation of the court, Jaco's lawyer decided to appeal: first to the 
provincial court of Holland and finally to the Hoge Raad. Jaco was 
not as lucky as the bailiff mentioned above. Both courts rejected his 
appeal and confirmed both the change of procedure and the Amster-
dam verdict. In 1718 Jaco died on the scaffold. The mere fact, 
however, that he had been in the position to lodge an appeal was felt 
3 5 For further information about Jaco and his gang see Florike EGMOND, 
Underworlds. Organized Crime in the Netherlands, 1650-1800, Cambridge, 
Polity Press, 1993, with further references. Jaco is still relatively well known 
in the Netherlands. During the 1990s several articles and a children's book 
have been devoted to him. Frans Thuijs is currently writing a historical 
dissertation about Jaco and his companions. 
[MyC, 4, 2001,43-91] 
72 Florike Egmond 
to be so shocking that the authorities proposed new measures. They 
never wanted to come across another case in which a 'hardened crimi-
nal' could earn legal rights by standing up to torture. Still in the same 
year (1718) the Estates General approved a draft law that had been 
inspired directly by the Jaco case. It denied any kind of appeal to all 
defendants belonging to the category of vagrants, thieves or beggars 
who had been convicted previously —whatever the type of criminal 
procedure 3 6. This law remained in force until the penal reforms of the 
French revolutionary period. During the remaining eight decades of 
the 18th century it further restricted the already minimal legal protec-
tion of those who belonged to the despised and feared groups at the 
social margins. As will be shown in the following section the Edictum 
Jacotianum of 1718 was much more than a procedural adjustment: it 
formed part of a structural politico-juridical policy of exclusion. 
6. Justice for whom? 
The first few cases discussed in this article throw some light on the 
structurally weak position of those defendants in the 16th- and 17th-
century Northern Netherlands who saw themselves confronted by 
arrogant, overbearing, or corrupt prosecutors. They also clarified 
which circumstances enabled defendants to put up resistance to these 
officials. In the second group of examples the focus was not on abuse 
of power but on the ways in which defendants could use legal loopho-
les, lack of clarity in the procedural rules, or political and judicial 
rivalry to their own advantage. We have also seen how the authorities 
tried to fill such gaps and close legal loopholes. That in itself should 
make us think twice about the general tenor of Dutch (or even Conti-
nental European) criminal justice at the time. Whose interests did it 
serve? Did criminal justice function as an instrument serving the pur-
poses and interests of particular groups in society —even if everything 
went by the book and there was no abuse of power? And if so, what 
does that tell us about the relations between subjects and authorities in 
a society that has long been characterised as relatively tolerant and 
egalitarian? 
3 6 For an 18th-century summary of the case against Jaco, see Jan 
WAGENAAR, Amsterdam in zijn Opkomst. Vol I, Amsterdam, I. Tirion, 
1760, pp. 732-33. 
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A short sketch of the way criminal justice was organised and of the 
main outlines of criminal procedure is sufficient to trace this tenor 3 7. In 
the Northern Netherlands each town, each city and sometimes even 
each village or group of villages, each polder, and each larger section 
of a province constituted a separate jurisdictional territory: the so-
called 'high jurisdiction'. The judicial geography of the Dutch Re-
public thus looked like a fine-meshed web. We may also describe this 
situation as one of extreme fragmentation of judicial powers. The size 
(both in terms of kilometres and number of inhabitants) of such high 
jurisdictions or territories varied from a village, a small town or castle 
to a large part of a province or a major city. Size, however, did not 
influence autonomy: the verdict pronounced by the court of a small 
jurisdiction was just as valid as one pronounced by the town court of, 
for instance, Amsterdam. In the province of Holland alone there were 
more than 200 such 'high jurisdictions'. Each of them had its own 
sheriff and almost autonomous criminal court with full powers within 
its own territory to prosecute criminal cases and impose punishments 
including the death penalty3 8. 
The extent of the territorial autonomy of these local criminal courts 
was astonishing. Only a few categories of suspects and types of 
offences were dealt with directly by other courts, such as soldiers and 
3 7 Much has been published about the organisation of Dutch early modern 
criminal justice, but the emphasis in most of the publications which origi-
nated in a juridical or legal historical context is on formal aspects, whereas 
publications by historians generally concentrate on only one city or court. 
Comparatively little attention has been paid to rural criminal justice. The 
following sketch is largely based on research in the records of all local crimi-
nal courts (both rural and urban) in the Dutch provinces of Holland, Zealand 
and Brabant and goes back to EGMOND, Underworlds...; and Florike 
EGMOND, "Fragmentatie, rechtsverscheidenheid en rechtsongelijkheid in de 
Noordelijke Nederlanden tijdens de 17e en 18e eeuw" in Sjoerd FABER (ed.), 
Nieuw licht op oude Justifie. Misdaad en straf ten tijde van de Republiek, 
Muiderberg, D. Coutinho, 1989, pp. 9-23. For an important contemporary 
work about criminal law and procedure see Joos(t) DE DAMHOUDER, 
Practijcke ende hant-boeck in criminele saacken (ill. ed. 1555; Lat. ed. 
Praxis rerum criminalium, Antwerp, 1570). 
3 8 This situation did not originate in the early modern period but already 
existed in the 13th and 14th centuries, possible even earlier. 
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the court officials themselves, coin clipping and forgery, high treason 
and some other political crimes. Attempts at interference with each 
other's suspects or procedure as well as infringement on each other's 
territory were a continuous source of rivalry between the local crimi-
nal courts3 9. Quite a few of them were more interested in competition 
than in co-operation —a situation that was exploited to the full by all 
professional and mobile criminals. 
Besides these local criminal courts, most Dutch provinces had a 
provincial court, while a supreme court, the Hoge Raad, was created 
in 1582 as symbol of the newly created Dutch Republic. The role of 
these higher courts was much more important in civil cases than in 
criminal ones, precisely because appeal was not allowed (as we have 
seen above) in most criminal cases. The higher courts thus dealt with 
only a small number of all criminal procedures and for most of the 
16th, 17th and 18th centuries some 90% of all criminal trials ended 
where they had started: at the local level4 0. The higher courts wanted a 
larger share of the "criminal trials" and attempted to change this 
situation, often by encroaching on the lower courts' privileges. As we 
have seen, the politics of 'appeal' (which helped to take a case out of 
one court's powers and into another one's) provided a particularly 
suitable instrument for such machinations. Understandably, this policy 
sometimes brought the higher courts into open conflict with the local 
3 9 A nice example concerns a 16th-century conflict between the town of 
Delft and the abbot of Egmond, which was taken all the way to the Supreme 
Court. The abbot claimed high (i.e. criminal) jurisdiction in a certain territory 
close to the town of Delft and therefore had the local gallows (re)surrected. 
The town council of Delft immediately instructed its carpenter to take down 
this symbol of high jurisdiction. The ensuing case lasted for years. See GRM 
Dossier Appeals 698-1 (circa 1557). 
4 0 The situation in the northern Dutch province of Friesland was some-
what different on account of earlier and stronger centralisation. The provin-
cial Court of Friesland controlled nearly all criminal cases in this province. 
See esp. Arend H. HUUSSEN Jr., "Jurisprudentie en bureaucratie; het Hof 
van Friesland en zijn criminele rechtspraak in de achttiende eeuw", 
Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden, 
93, 1978, pp. 241-298; and Idem, Veroordeeld in Friesland. 
Criminaliteitsbestrijding in de eeuw der Verlichting, Leeuwarden, Hedeby 
Publishing, 1994. 
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ones. As we have seen in some of the cases discussed above, outright 
conflict could also flare up between the provincial courts and the 
Grote Raad van Mechelen or its successor the Hoge Raad 4 1. 
It is commonly known that there was no formal distinction 
between government and the judiciary in most of Continental Europe 
before the French Revolution. Members of the local criminal courts 
(or schepenen as they were called in the Netherlands) acted as judges 
in criminal trials one moment and during a next meeting joined the 
local burgomasters to form the town council. Their prerogatives as 
judges underpinned their formal and informal administrative powers 
and vice versa. The local criminal courts usually had some four to 
nine members. They were recruited from the circles of respectable 
(i.e. of good repute and well-to-do), male and (during the period of the 
Dutch Republic) mainly Protestant inhabitants of the relevant juris-
diction. Neither women, Jews nor Roman Catholics could hold the 
position of court member, and this was also true of a considerable part 
of the male population which did not fulfil the criteria of 
respectability and (relative) wealth. In principle, court members held 
this function for only one year at a time, but they could be re-
appointed (or re-elected by co-optation) after an interval of a year. In 
the countryside this usually meant that the function of court member 
circulated among the fairly limited circles of wealthy farmers, arti-
sans, merchants and local notables. A law degree was not required and 
in the countryside there were very few trained lawyers among the 
court members. In the larger towns and cities, however, trained law-
yers were more prominently represented among the court members, 
and membership of both court and city council was often monopolised 
by members of a small number of elite and upper middle-class fami-
4 1 Such attempts were by no means always succesful. A lawyer from Ma-
lines, Jan Scheers de Jonge, argued that the local sheriff and court had no 
right to interrogate him under torture on suspicion of heresy. Scheers argued 
that only the church courts were competent in such matters, and he was 
supported in this case (for understandable reasons) by the bishop of the rele-
vant diocese. Scheers lost his case. See GRM sentence nr. 1692, 11 January 
1552 (1551). With respect to the Burgundian period Wim Blockmans has 
drawn attention to the importance of such power conflicts between local and 
higher courts for state formation —a theme that is also of central importance 
to the work of Hugo de Schepper, albeit for a slightly later period. 
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lies, who continually co-opted their own cousins, brothers, uncles, 
nephews and fathers. Nonetheless, a very large majority of all 
Northern Dutch court members had no legal background or training 
whatsoever. 
In many respects the Dutch situation resembled the organisation of 
criminal justice in other continental European countries north of the 
Alps. Local courts consisting of lay judges likewise dealt with a large 
part of criminal justice in the Southern Netherlands, most of Germany, 
and France. However, political and judicial centralisation had pro-
gressed much farther in France, delimiting the power of the local 
criminal courts, whereas in many parts of Germany the influence of 
trained lawyers and of local (princely and other) rulers was much 
stronger than in the Northern Netherlands. Thus the organisation of 
criminal justice at the local level shows many family resemblances 
with that in other parts of Europe, but the combination of territorial 
fragmentation, considerable autonomy of 'first instance' criminal jus-
tice in the Northern Netherlands, the lack of administrative centrali-
sation, the dominant role of lay judges and the relatively minor one of 
trained lawyers, and the near absence of a right to appeal to higher 
courts in criminal cases, all went together to produce a special judicial 
system which gave extended powers to local lay judges from the 
Protestant middle and upper classes4 2. 
Yet their powers were not unlimited, and even outside the city 
courts and the provincial and supreme courts there was some room for 
4 2 Thus the territorial basis of the high jurisdictions, the principal charac-
teristics of the local criminal courts, and the distinction between extraordi-
nary and ordinary procedure can be found in both the Netherlands, Germany 
and France. The degree of independence of the local courts as well as proce-
dural rules governing appeal and the influence of trained lawyers differed 
from one country (or even region) to another on the Continent. For old but 
still useful comparative discussions of criminal justice see John H. 
LANGBEIN, Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance. England, Germany, 
France, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1974; and Torture and 
the Law of Proof. Europe and England in the Ancien Regime, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1977. Cf. Raoul Charles VAN CAENEGEM, 
Judges, legislators and professors. Chapters in European legal history, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 33-39. 
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both direct and indirect influence of trained jurists. There were two 
crucial moments in a criminal trial in which professional legal advice 
had to be asked by court and prosecutor: when the court considered 
either a verdict of interrogation by torture or a decision to impose 
corporal punishment. In each case the court had to request the written 
advice of two or three so-called "impartial lawyers". On the basis of 
the remaining archival records it is impossible, however, to determine 
whether courts generally obeyed this rule. Indirectly, the example of 
the provincial courts and Hoge Raad also provided a counterweight 
against extreme forms of autonomous policy and procedure by local 
criminal courts. Finally, as the case studies showed, the higher courts 
occasionally also provided a certain safe-guard against the worst cases 
of corruption, abuse of power and similar acts by the local courts and 
sheriffs —but as a last resort they were only available to those defen-
dants who knew how to find their way to such courts, were not poor, 
and had the support of their family and friends. 
Each high jurisdiction —whether it comprised a city or rural terri-
tory— had its own sheriff or bailiff, who united many functions in one 
person: he acted as head of police (being responsible both for main-
taining public order and for criminal investigation, arresting, and in-
terrogating suspects); he acted as public prosecutor, formulating the 
indictment and the "criminal conclusion" which summed up the 
charge, confession and other evidence, and proposed a particular form 
of punishment; and finally he acted as chairman of the local court 
sessions until the moment when the lay judges (schepenen) started to 
discuss the final verdict. Who appointed the sheriff or bailiff de-
pended on various local rules and traditions: in the cities he was 
usually chosen by the town council, in rural districts by the provincial 
estates or the descendants of a former feudal lord. Given their many 
functions the sheriffs and bailiffs formed the lynchpin of Dutch crimi-
nal justice. As in the case of the lay judges, legal training was not 
required to hold the office of sheriff or bailiff —but the public prose-
cutors of the cities and larger towns often did have some legal 
training, while all of the public prosecutors of the provincial courts 
and the supreme court were lawyers. Most sheriffs and bailiffs be-
longed to the higher middle and upper classes, albeit it only rarely to 
the top layers of the elite. At least part of their income came from the 
fines and composition payments they imposed. They usually remained 
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in function for years, sometimes even for decades or for life. That was 
one reason why local courts with their changing membership often 
had great problems in getting rid of autocratic, corrupt, incompetent, 
or even senile bailiffs43. Their influence, contacts, and considerable 
discretionary powers offered them a unique and powerful position in 
the local community which was ideally suited for extortion and other 
types of abuse of power and office. We have already seen how little 
even the provincial courts and the supreme court could do to coun-
teract such corrupt sheriffs. 
Looking at the composition of the nearly autonomous local crimi-
nal courts with their lay judges who dealt with the vast majority of all 
criminal cases it is not difficult to see whose interests were served 
most by criminal justice in the Dutch Republic: not the lowest social 
classes, not women, Jews or (during the period of the Dutch Republic) 
Catholics (irrespective of their wealth or respectability4 4), but Protes-
tant men from the higher and middle classes, in particular local nota-
bles and the urban patriciate4 5. The crucial boundaries between those 
with civic rights who could count on a large degree of legal protection 
and those with very few rights followed the dividing lines of wealth 
and class, gender and religion. This conclusion does not imply, 
4 3 A good example of such a local potentate is Nicolaes van Berendrecht, 
who acted as sheriff of Leiden from 1539 to 1565-66, when he had to retire 
on account of bad health. He died in 1567, left enormous debts, and was 
succeeded in 1567-68 by his son Jan. A mass of documents is kept in the 
Municipal Archive of Leiden concerning his misconduct, which could easily 
form the basis for a monograph. See also Florike EGMOND, "Limits of 
tolerance. Justice and anti-semitism in a sixteenth-century Dutch town" in 
Jewish History, 8, 1994, pp. 73-94; and Jeremy Dupertois BANGS, "Book 
and art collection of the Low Countries in the later sixteenth century: 
evidence from Leiden" in Sixteenth Century Journal, 13, 1982, pp. 25-39. 
4 4 The rule that barred Catholics from public office was not always obser-
ved, especially in the Southern Dutch provinces during the 18th century. 
4 5 The role of the nobility has to be ignored here, both because they played 
no part as defendants in criminal cases, and because very little is known 
about their influence on the appointment of sheriffs and bailiffs, or their own 
occupation of such offices. A synthetic monograph is much needed about the 
role of Dutch bailiffs as key figures in the maintenance of public order and in 
criminal prosecution. For the Southern Netherlands see VAN ROMPAEY, op. 
cit. 
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however, that all lay judges in the Netherlands cynically manipulated 
criminal justice to further their own interests. Many of them un-
doubtedly believed in justice and fulfilled their duties as best they 
could— conscientiously, with integrity and sincerity. The point here is 
that early modern criminal justice in the Netherlands had an inherent 
bias with respect to certain parts of the population. Men belonging to 
a limited section of Dutch society were in control of both political and 
judicial matters. The rest had no alternative but to accept this situa-
tion. 
It is not only the composition of the local criminal courts or the 
considerable degree of autonomy that point towards this bias, but also 
the ways in which criminal law and procedure could be used as ins-
truments of power and exclusion. It is a commonplace to state that not 
only social but also legal equality was the rule until 1800. Far less is 
commonly known of the practical effects of legal inequality. It meant 
that not everyone enjoyed the same degree of legal protection. 
Whether a defendant in a criminal case had many or few rights com-
pletely depended in the Netherlands —as in Germany or France— on 
the question of whether he or she had a permanent residence and a 
good reputation or, on the contrary, was known to lead a vagrant or 
itinerant life. Someone who belonged to the latter category eluded 
(and therefore subverted) social control by 'established' citizens. Pre-
cisely for that reason fewer formalities were required to arrest or tor-
ture suspects who belonged to this 'mobile' category. The evidence in 
their cases was not evaluated in a different way from that of other 
defendants, but since poor and itinerant suspects usually owned no 
property and were regarded as dangerous precisely because of their 
mobility, they were often locked up or physically punished instead of 
given fines. Social status and respectability —or the lack of them— 
thus determined to a large extent the procedural rules to be followed 
and the type of punishment to be imposed. 
The crucial boundary between those with many rights and those 
with very few is expressed in the difference between ordinary and 
extraordinary criminal procedure. Both types have been mentioned 
above in the case studies. The bulk of all criminal cases in the Nether-
lands followed the extraordinary procedure with minimal rights for 
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the defendant46. And the bulk of the defendants in these cases be-
longed to the category of 'outsiders' without a fixed domicile, in-
cluding beggars, vagrants, itinerant salesmen, artisans and rural la-
bourers, sailors between jobs, ex-soldiers, fairground performers, etc. 
Jaco is a good example. But even some well-to-do and 'respectable' 
defendants were tried by this procedure. In bailiff De Witte's case it 
was the type of offence (political crimes) that determined the proce-
dure, not his social position. He was understandably worried because 
of the ensuing lack of civil rights. In an extraordinary procedure the 
defendant had no right whatsoever to legal defence. The defendants in 
such cases were arrested, detained, interrogated, sometimes tortured, 
confronted with witnesses, and eventually sentenced (sometimes to 
death) without legal aid and without even having the right to see the 
documents in their case. Some of them may have been unaware right 
up to the verdict what they were precisely charged with. Their situa-
tion was all the more perilous because if they confessed during 
interrogation —which at least some three quarters of them did, even 
without torture—they lost any right to appeal4 7. Unlike bailiff De 
Witte they were almost never able to challenge the court's verdict. 
It is significant that the bulk of all criminal cases followed the ex-
traordinary procedure —involving minimal legal protection— and 
concerned defendants who can be categorised as unwanted 'outsiders'. 
For it was precisely that social category which formed the main threat 
to the security of the middle and upper classes and their undisturbed 
possession of property. It is all the more interesting to investigate how 
big (or small) the difference was between the treatment of these de-
fendants and that of the small percentage of defendants who were 
accorded an ordinary procedure and who mainly came from the cir-
cles of more or less respected local (established) inhabitants. It should 
be noted that the Dutch criminal records for the period 1500-1800 
4 6 The first instance court that dealt with a case —generally one of the lo-
cal criminal courts— was the one that decided which type of procedure was 
to be followed. 
4 7 This was not always as dramatic as it sounds. Many of these cases con-
cerned petty theft or other minor offences, and the defendants were well 
aware that they would get away with banishment, whipping, or a short term 
in the house of correction at most. 
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provide us with only very few defendants in criminal cases who be-
longed to the real upper classes —a tell-tale fact in itself. The defen-
dants who were tried by ordinary procedure did not belong to the aris-
tocracy, urban patriciate, or even the higher ranks of the bourgeoisie, 
but mainly to the urban and rural middle classes, the circles of small 
entrepreneurs and tradesmen, artisans, and in rare cases to the local 
notables. The locksmith from Alkmaar and the farmer from Weesp are 
fairly typical examples. 
This category was —usually but not always— tried by ordinary 
procedure not because of the different type of crimes they had 
committed but purely on the basis of their social position. Even if they 
were tried for murder these defendants did not always have to be de-
tained. They had a right to legal defence and their lawyer had to be 
given copies of all documents in the case. Torture was used less fre-
quently than in extraordinary cases and punishment more often in-
cluded fines, confiscation of property, and barring from a particular 
function or office. Neither corporal punishment nor interrogation by 
torture were excluded, however, and ordinary procedures could and 
did end in capital sentences. One of the main differences —and per-
haps the most important one to the defendants themselves, besides the 
right to legal defence— was the right to lodge an appeal against a ver-
dict in an ordinary procedure and thus turn to a higher (provincial or 
supreme) court. As we have seen, the Grote Raad van Mechelen and 
its successor after 1582, the Hoge Raad, did not have to limit them-
selves to a procedural scrutiny; they could and did sometimes start a 
whole new investigation. Although even this category of defendants 
had great difficulties in resisting corrupt bailiffs, abuse of power by 
officials and other irregularities, they stood much more of a chance 
than their mobile counterparts. 
As a last structural characteristic of early modern criminal justice -
one that can be found all over Continental Europe —we should men-
tion its procedural "fluidity": the fact that the boundaries between 
criminal and civil procedure or between the main types of criminal 
procedure were as yet less completely fixed than in later ages. The 
criminal trials of the early modern period (like those of modern times) 
are primarily distinguished from the civil ones by the fact that "the 
state" was actively involved and instigated the procedure —either in 
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the person of the sheriff or bailiff at the local level, or of the prosecu-
tor general at the level of the provincial court or Hoge Raad. In civil 
cases two (or more) private and basically equal parties confronted 
each other in court, asking the judges to help them reach a compro-
mise or pronounce a verdict in favour of one party which had to be 
adhered to by the other party as well. The boundaries between civil 
and criminal procedures were less solid than now, however: elements 
of each could be combined, or transitional types of procedure could be 
followed which might change from civil to criminal and back again. 
Cases that looked intrinsically similar could be dealt with by civil 
procedure one time and by criminal one the next. A civil case could 
change into a criminal one, a criminal case could suddenly lose its 
criminal character, or criminal and civil charges could be combined in 
a case that had at first looked like a civil one 4 8. This procedural fluidity 
might offer extra opportunities to the defendants —and in this respect 
the loopholes caused by procedural fluidity look very much like the 
ones caused by interjurisdictional rivalry. However, flexible 'rules' 
might be detrimental to the defendant's prospects and could also offer 
the courts and prosecutors more latitude to "come to grips" with a 
defendant. Jaco's case demonstrated both aspects. 
The above sketch shows us the contours of a judicial system that 
not only manifested the fundamental inequality considered normal in 
early modern society, but actively propagated this inequality and 
served as an instrument in perpetuating it —a policy that was in the 
interests of the established and well-to-do citizens. In practice— con-
trasting this term with ideology and both contemporary and later 
ideals of justice —criminal justice and prosecution served primarily to 
come to grips with persons and groups who belonged to the lowest 
rungs of society and through their mobile way of life eluded (or 
looked as if they might elude) social control by the established part of 
4 8 For more information about the differences between these types of 
criminal procedure, see especially Jos MONBALLYU, "Het onderscheid 
hassen de civiele en de criminele en de ordinaire en de extraordinaire 
strafrechtspleging in het Vlaamse recht van de 16e eeuw" in Herman A. 
DIEDERIKS and Herman W. ROODENBURG (eds.), Misdaad, zoen en straf. 
Aspekten van de middeleeuwse strafrechtsgeschiedenis in de Nederlanden, 
Hilversum, Verloren, 1991, pp. 120-132, even though he primarily discusses 
the Southern Netherlands. 
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society. On account of their poverty defendants from these groups 
were unable to pay fines or damages, which meant they had to pay 
with the only things they possessed: body and liberty. In contrast, 
criminal justice and prosecution both protected and proffered legal 
rights to those who were expected as "people of quality" to keep 
themselves and each other from violating the norms and laws. 
7. Conclusion 
What precisely can these case studies tell us? Was criminal justice 
in the early modern Netherlands really that bad? At first sight it was. 
Considering both the structural inequality built into the system and the 
examples of extortion, corruption, and abuse of power discussed 
above —in which rivalry, political interests, and power games in-
fluenced (or even guided) both policy and verdicts of the higher 
courts— it is hard to avoid the conclusion that criminal justice in the 
Northern Netherlands between 1500 and 1800 was a corrupt and cruel 
instrument in the hands of the higher middle classes and elite. But that 
would be a partial misrepresentation. Above all it rests on a simplistic 
combination of structural characteristics (such as inequality before the 
law and concomitant class justice) and examples that are by definition 
incidental. Furthermore, it proceeds from the implicit assumption that 
these examples are representative, typical, normal. The assumption is 
false, and the typical is of no interest or value to us here in any case. 
These examples cannot —and in fact historical cases never can— be 
taken to be typical or representative in a statistical or quantitative 
sense: as if they represent the normal shape of things. That does not 
prevent them from being important, significant or illuminating, 
however. The case studies discussed above are special, unusual, and 
sometimes even transgressive/borderline examples which help us dis-
cover patterns, structures, boundaries and power relations that are at 
least half-hidden by ideologically informed views of history as all 
view of history, of course, are4 9. 
We can be brief about the 'normal' course of criminal justice and 
prosecution in the Northern Netherlands. As I have tried to show 
4 9 For an extensive discussion of these methodological issues see 
EGMOND and MASON, The Mammoth... 
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elsewhere, more unity and uniformity existed in criminal justice in the 
Dutch Republic than one might expect given its enormous organisa-
tional and territorial fragmentation. An everyday criminal case did 
not, on the whole, proceed like the cases discussed above. Corruption 
and cruelty seem to have been —in so far as we can still trace them in 
the records— neither exceptional nor routine 5 0. As long as we accept 
that legal inequality was considered normal and that current opinion 
accepted torture and corporal punishment in public, most criminal 
cases proceeded more or less according to the rules, and large num-
bers of sheriffs and bailiffs were not corrupt. The crux of the matter, 
of course, lies in the rules themselves: the fundamental legal ine-
quality and the exemplary character of early modern criminal justice 
and prosecution. Since these core aspects of early modern justice were 
shared by all Continental European systems of justice (but not, or only 
partly, by Anglo-Saxon justice) whatever their organisational and 
procedural differences, in this respect the Dutch case may help us to 
discover issues that are of a much wider, Continental European rele-
vance. 
The individual abuse of power and transgressions of the rules by 
cruel and corrupt officials discussed in the case studies above reveal 
the weak areas of Dutch (perhaps even Continental European) crimi-
nal justice —its potential for corruption, the weak spots where things 
easily went wrong, those recurring situations in which it was easy and 
tempting to bend the rules or exceed the limits. They also reveal 
which officials could do so most easily and which persons or groups 
were their "natural" victims. Thereby they point to the rules and 
norms of a society which helped create or maintain such flaws, or at 
5 0 It is impossible to specifiy corruption by courts and sheriffs in a quan-
titative sense —first because of the nature of the offence itself, second be-
cause of the exemplary character of early modern criminal justice and the 
fragmentation of judicial organisation, and third because the realy modern 
records are (as they always must be) incomplete. That is not so much of a 
problem as it may seem, because for the present article we do not need more 
than a general outline. At the same time I would like to call for more research 
concerning the meaning and nature of corruption, and the wide-ranging role 
of sheriffs and bailiffs in the early modern period. 
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least did not combat, mend, or improve them 5 1. Some of the examples 
discussed above have a further dimension and are revealing in yet 
another sense because they became test cases and (looked as if they 
might) set precedents. Good examples are the cases of the bandit Jaco, 
the suspected sorceress Neeltjen and, to a lesser extent, bailiff De 
Witte. Test cases —whether they were intended as such or not— by 
definition explore the margins of legal (and other) categories. They 
are always exceptional. After all, no one needs a test case as long as 
ordinary and everyday matters are being dealt with. It is precisely 
because they explore the limits that such test cases are so revealing 
and significant. The people involved were very well aware of this. As 
we have seen, at least two of the cases discussed here had substantial 
consequences for the history of criminal prosecution and procedure in 
the Northern Netherlands. 
Together these examples highlight a number of interesting and by 
no means incidental characteristics of Dutch criminal justice during 
the long period starting in the late Middle Ages and ending with the 
French Revolution. First, it is no coincidence that the rights of defen-
dants were most seriously jeopardised in two types of situations: 
whenever adhering to those civic rights was going to subvert public 
order (or what was felt to be public order), as in the case of Jaco who 
claimed rights that were not meant for "his kind of people"; and 
whenever the limited degree of power held by the higher political and 
judicial institutions over the local courts and authorities —a phenome-
non directly related to the enormous judicial and political fragmenta-
tion of the Netherlands —created opportunities for local bailiffs and 
sheriffs to become local autocrats who first and foremost served their 
own interests. The early modern higher courts and Estates General 
were by no means naive and they did acknowledge the problem, just 
as contemporary lawyers and politicians were aware of the strength of 
local particularism and its centrifugal effects. To what extent they 
acknowledged the problem emerges in salient fashion from the decla-
ration by the Hoge Raad quoted above. This statement, after all, justi-
5 1 For an extensive discussion of the question of historical 'clues' and 
Carlo Ginzburg's perspective on them, see EGMOND and MASON, The 
Mammoth...; and Florike EGMOND & Peter MASON, "A horse called Be-
lisarius" in History Workshop Journal, 47, 1999, pp. 240-252. 
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fied the role of the Hoge Raad itself as court of appeal in criminal 
cases by arguing that it could guarantee legal protection for private 
citizens against representatives of the same judicial system of which 
the Hoge Raad was a part. 
Fears of a pending subversion of public order were even stronger. 
The 'tolerant' Dutch republic rested on foundations of social, eco-
nomic, and judicial exclusion. Civil rights and privileges were a badge 
of distinction: some had them, others therefore did not. To possess or 
not to possess such rights was a constitutive characteristic of both 
identity and social status —in the case not only of individuals but also 
of groups, organisations and institutions. Right down to the years of 
the French Revolution early modern Dutch justice displayed a con-
siderable number of traits more usually associated with the late middle 
ages —when rights were always limited according to time, place, and 
social group. As Robert Bartlett put it: 
"jural discontinuity or diversity was the presumption, not, as in the 
modern world, jural uniformity. People, places and times had their 
own distinctive legal status, recognized in law and custom. (...) In the 
Middle Ages equality before the law was as distant as the metric 
system or the Gregorian calendar"52. 
When it looked as if individuals were going to break out of the 
categories designed for them, thereby subverting public order in the 
most literal sense of the term, immediate attempts were made to re-
instate and strengthen those boundaries, whether by legal or by eco-
nomic, political, or violent means 5 3. Order was restored. 
5 2 Robert BARTLETT, "Mortal enmities ": the legal aspect of hostility in 
the middle ages, Aberystwyth, Jones Pierce Lecture, 1998, pp. 2-3. 
5 3 This applied as much to an individual (Jaco) as to a group, institution, 
or town that tried to expand its privileges. The 18th-century local by-laws 
that reinforced the restrictions on the sale of specific types of textiles by Jews 
are interesting in this respect. These by-laws were proclaimed when it trans-
pired that Jewish tradesmen had discovered some loopholes in legislation 
barring them from a whole range of economic activities (including owning 
land). 
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A second striking aspect of the cases discussed here is that persons 
who had been the victims of corruption and flagrant abuse of power 
by officials still had recourse to courts to right their wrongs. The 
farmer who had his own cattle stolen back from the sheriff and whose 
friends started a local riot nonetheless turned to the Court of Holland 
for restoration of his honour and damages. The locksmith from Alk-
maar who wanted revenge, restoration, and payment of damages took 
his case all the way to the Grote Raad of Mechelen; Jaco's appeal 
went to the provincial Court of Holland and thereafter to the Hoge 
Raad. And these are just a few examples out of the dozens of such 
cases that can be found in the archives of the Grote Raad, Hoge Raad, 
and the provincial Court of Holland. We should not forget, however, 
that only well-to-do and established citizens —i.e. those who could 
count on an ordinary procedure including defence and appeal— 
turned to the higher courts and had any reason at all to trust in them 5 4. 
The bandit Jaco was one of the very few non-respected private per-
sons who managed to lodge an appeal with a higher court —and we 
have seen how it ended. 
It would take a new investigation to discover to what extent these 
private citizens who lodged an appeal did indeed trust in the impartia-
lity of the judiciary and believed in "justice". While not discarding 
that possibility, it might be useful to keep an open mind on this issue. 
On the one hand, interpreting their behaviour as a sign of trust fits in 
perfectly with a view of law and the judiciary as a means of resolving 
conflicts —a rather simplistic view, as we have seen. On the other 
hand it leads us to think that turning to the law means renouncing all 
other means— another simplification. Without influential witnesses 
who attested to Neeltjen's honour and good reputation, she would 
have been tortured and sentenced to death. Without the help of friends 
and relatives the locksmith from Alkmaar might just as well have 
dropped his case against bailiff Jan Gerytsz, and the farmer from 
5 4 We should not be naive, however, about alternative 'means' either: not 
everyone could start a feud or riot, manipulate factionalism, pull political 
strings, or enter into forms of private violence. I would not be at all surprised 
if those who did indeed have access to such forms of self-help belonged to 
roughly the same groups and social categories as those who were able to rum 
to the higher courts. 
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Weesp would have never seen his cows again. All of this required 
both physical and social strength. No one who could not help himself 
(or herself), who was socially isolated, or lacked a network of friends, 
relatives and patrons could count on support by higher courts against 
powerful local bailiffs and other officials. In this respect civil rights 
mainly helped those who were able (to a certain extent) to help and 
protect themselves 5 5. 
We can go one step further: to defendants legal means were just 
one more instrument, which could be combined with political, social 
and economic measures, and if necessary with violence as well. Such 
means were not at all mutually exclusive. An overspecialised (techni-
cal-juridical) approach to (historical) court cases has often made re-
searchers blind to this mundane phenomenon, as well as to the fact 
that these cases are about the real lives of real persons and not only 
about their representations in juridical terms and contexts. The con-
clusion that the use of violence by defendants and the use of legal 
means by those same persons were by no means mutually exclusive, is 
in outright contradiction to the view that state formation (entailing 
conflict-solving by juridical rather than violent means) goes with an 
increasing state monopoly of the means of violence5 6. Recourse to the 
courts did not exclude the use of private violence. The case studies 
demonstrated, on the contrary, that physical action, violence, honour, 
and social force were of crucial importance within the juridical proce-
dures themselves. Physical strength (the locksmith and the farmer) 
and physical endurance (Jaco) turned out to be extremely useful 'ins-
truments' to coerce the courts to offer some form of justice rather than 
mere law 5 7. 
55 Cf. the conclusions in BLOCKMANS, Privaat en openbaar domein..., p. 
719, who does, however, only mention wealth as a requirement to be able to 
take legal action. 
5 6 There is a broad range of perspectives on state-formation: some argue 
that only organised forms of group violence were eventually monopolised by 
the state, others also include various forms of 'private' violence among those 
categories of violence that were eventually monopolised by the state. 
5 7 These conclusions support a point eloquently phrased and developed 
further by Robert BARTLETT: "The immediate and natural reaction of a 
twentieth-century mind is to relate the existence of enmity to the weakness of 
the state" ... , "To call the world in which enmity flourished stateless pre-
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The considerable importance of physical and social strength and 
the fact that honour and reputation could be worth more than a defen-
dant's life to him or her invite further reflection. The role and signifi-
cance of the honourable witnesses testifying to Neeltjen's good repu-
tation, who staked their own name and honour for hers— should re-
mind us of the sworn assistants in medieval court cases, when 'repu-
tation' could be much more important than what we now call evi-
dence 5 8. Furthermore, the defendants in the case studies discussed 
above remarkably often demanded first and foremost restoration of 
their honour and only then the payment of damages or other types of 
compensation. This was not just a matter of rhetoric. The crux of 
Neeltjen's whole campaign to clear her name was the fact that her 
reputation had been seriously damaged by rumour. She literally risked 
her life in order to regain her reputation. Justice, the restoration of 
honour, and finally compensation —those appear to have been the 
chief purposes of the defendants. 
The fact that honour, reputation and social and physical strength 
played such key roles in these cases fits in very well with the exem-
plary character of contemporary justice in Continental Europe, and in 
a sense goes with the lack of juridical uniformity mentioned earlier. 
At the time no judicial authorities would try to act and prosecute in 
every instance of crime, in every case of corruption. It was normal to 
highlight only the most tell-tale and striking crimes in any defendant's 
confession, and to formally include only those in the indictment. The 
rest was not forgotten, but subsumed under the more striking ones, 
and thus remained 'below the surface'. In a similar way, no public 
authorities in early modern Continental Europe ever attempted to pro-
secute each and every person suspected of a crime. This had little to 
do with a lack of manpower or money, and even less so with negli-
gence, but mainly with a different view of justice and the role of the 
supposes the traditional sociological characterization of the state as the mo-
nopolist of legitimate violence"... "There may be merit in at least conside-
ring a different picture, one which would stress that the violence of the state 
in the modem period can be seen not as public violence reborn but as private 
violence writ large". Mortal enmities..., pp. 13-14. 
5 8 In this respect comparison with legal systems outside Europe (espe-
cially Islamic and Chinese law) might be illuminating. 
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judiciary in which criminal procedure, trial, verdict, and punishment 
should be symbolically effective in an exemplary way rather than 
effective in a quantitative sense5 9. In this kind of context physical 
force, social strength and the efforts of friends and relatives —which 
all presuppose reputation and honour— were not a luxury but a ne-
cessity. 
These considerations are no more than an attempt to historicise — 
or de-anachronise— notions of justice and the law. We need to take 
one further step while focusing on the concept of legal protection. 
This will also take us back to the differences between the British and 
the Continental European historical and historiographical contexts, 
and to the question of why connections between power and criminal 
justice could apparently be discussed more easily in the British con-
text than in the Continental one. It is no coincidence that concepts 
such as civil rights and legal protection —in the sense of rights that 
set limits to the powers of the authorities— are extremely hard to 
translate from Dutch, German, French and perhaps other Continental 
European languages as well into English6 0. On the Continent judicial 
activities were and are generally dealt with in writing. That was not 
only the case with legislation but also with the privileges and duties of 
the public authorities as well as those of the 'citizens' or 'subjects'. 
The legal protection of individuals, groups and institutions was based 
—in general terms— on rights that had been written down. Privileges 
that had not been set down on paper did not exist, and unless a group, 
individual, or institution could point to such documents, the rights 
were all on the side of the state. The English context —again in 
general terms— was almost the opposite. The rights of individuals, 
groups, or organizations did not have to be put on paper in the shape 
of privileges or civil rights, because the basic situation was one of 
civil liberties. The public authorities could not act against their 
subjects unless they had the explicit right to do so. A written 
5 9 See COHEN, op. cit. 
6 0 Both systems have the same medieval roots, by the way. For an interes-
ting discussion of some of the main differences between Anglo-Saxon and 
Continental legal traditions, see VAN CAENEGEM, op. cit, esp. pp. 33-39. 
Cf. Donald KELLEY, The human measure. Social thought in the Western 
legal tradition, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 1990. 
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constitution was not (or less) needed in this context and precedent (i.e. 
jurisprudence, the example of judicial practice rather than legislation) 
formed an important guarantee for the rights of individuals. 
It should set us thinking: an English historical tradition in which 
the rights of individuals came first and those of the state second, com-
bined with an influential British historiographical tradition in the field 
of crime and justice dominated by a critical perspective from below 
that proceeds from practice to ideology. On the other side of the North 
Sea, in the Netherlands —and possibly in a much larger part of Conti-
nental Europe— we find a much less critical, top-down perspective in 
the relevant section of historiography, with an emphasis on the inte-
rests of the state, public order, and on ideology, rules and procedures 
rather than on practice. This historiographical top-down tradition is 
seamlessly connected with a historical tradition in which the rights of 
the state always had priority over those of the individual. This rather 
disturbing double parallel between historical systems of justice and 
power, on the one hand, and historiographical traditions, on the other 
hand, calls for more than reflection. At best, it should be subverted 
and deconstructed. At least, it provides one of the principal reasons 
why it is important to occasionally distance ourselves from our own 
traditions and try to look at the history of our own societies with the 
eyes of an 'outsider' 6 1. 
61 Cf. Carlo GINZBURG, Occhiacci di legno. Nove riflessioni sulla dis-
tanza, Milano, Feltrinelli, 1998; and Idem, No island is an island. Four 
glances at English literature in a world perspective, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 2000. 
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